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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge, 
 
In this case, we are called upon to answer as a 
controlling question of law whether the law of the forum-- 
New Jersey--applies to liability insurance policies covering 
environmental damage claims arising out of numerous sites 
in many states. We answer that, in the circumstances here, 
New Jersey choice of law rules point to the law of the state 
where the insured had its principal place of business and 
executed the policies. If, however, that law differs from that 
of the state where the waste site is located, then the law of 
the waste site will apply. 
 
This is the second of two declaratory judgment actions 
brought to establish the extent of insurance coverage for a 
number of claims against NL Industries arising out of its 
nationwide lead processing activities. Instituted by NL, 
these actions were brought in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey under diversity 
jurisdiction. NL was incorporated in New Jersey until 
recently and still has some industrial plants there, but its 
national headquarters and principal place of business are 
located in New York. The insurance contracts were 
negotiated and executed by NL with a New York broker. 
 
NL initially filed the actions against Commercial Union 
Insurance Company, which then joined as third-party 
defendants, among others, certain underwriters at Lloyd's 
of London and Insurance Company of North America. NL 
later amended its complaint to add as defendants several 
other carriers, including International Insurance Company, 
International Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and 
Lexington Insurance Company. 
 
In the first case, we determined that under the law of the 
forum--New Jersey--coverage for the product liability 
claims at issue in that litigation would be governed by the 
law of the state of contracting--New York. NL Indus. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 314, 329 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(NL (I)). However, we also concluded that New Jersey might 
 
                                5 
  
treat environmental claims differently in light of the 
substantial weight given to the law of the states where the 
contamination occurred. Id. at 321-23. 
 
In this case, NL sought coverage for environmental 
pollution at 93 sites in 28 states. One of the carriers has 
informed us that the numbers have increased to 202 sites 
in 34 states. Thirty-two sites are located in New Jersey. 
 
In the course of pretrial proceedings, the parties agreed 
to select as representative locations contaminated sites in 
Illinois and Oregon to explore the choice of law questions 
basic to the litigation. Specifically, the parties dispute the 
meaning of the pollution exclusion and the late notice 
provisions in the policies. Differing interpretations of the 
two provisions by the various states involved presented the 
district court with complex choice of law problems. 
 
The district court granted partial summary judgments 
limited to choice of law issues, concluding that the law of 
the contaminated sites--Illinois and Oregon--would apply, 
rather than that of New York or New Jersey. See NL Indus. 
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 938 F.Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 
1996), reconsidering 926 F.Supp. 1213 (D.N.J. 1996). The 
court then certified as a controlling question of law under 
28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) whether the law of Illinois or Oregon, 
respectively, applied when interpreting the pollution 
exclusion and late notice clauses of the policies. We agreed 
to accept the question for review. 
 
I. 
 
At that time, in addition to the discussion in NL (I), we 
had the benefit of two decisions applying New Jersey choice 
of law rules to environmental coverage issues. See General 
Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. 
Ass'n. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993). Neither of these 
cases, however, involved coverage claims for multiple sites 
in multiple states. 
 
After oral argument in the case presently before us, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court issued three opinions that 
removed much of the uncertainty surrounding application 
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of its choice of law principles to multi-site, multi-state, 
environmental insurance coverage cases. Those cases 
presented facts closely analogous to those here, so we need 
not do more than briefly apply their holdings. See Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 712 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1998); 
Unisys Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 712 A.2d 649 
(N.J. 1998); H.M. Holdings, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
712 A.2d 645 (N.J. 1998); see generally Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (in a 
diversity case, law of the forum provides the applicable 
choice of law rules). 
 
In Pfizer, a corporate policyholder contended that New 
Jersey law should apply to its claim for insurance coverage 
in an environmental contamination case. The insured had 
its headquarters and principal place of business in New 
York and the policies were negotiated there, but it also had 
substantial operations in many other states, including New 
Jersey. Three states' laws competed for application--New 
Jersey's, New York's, and the waste site's. As in this case, 
the choice of law issues focused on interpretation of the 
pollution exclusion and late notice clauses in the policies. 
 
Following Gilbert Spruance, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the answer to the choice of law questions 
should be determined by analyzing the factors set forth in 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws  SS 193 and 6. 
Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 638-39. Under section 193, the court 
should apply the law of the place that " `the parties 
understood . . . to be the principal location of the insured 
risk . . . unless some other state has a more significant 
relationship under the principles stated in [section] 6 to the 
transaction and the parties.' " Id. at 638 (citing Gilbert 
Spruance, 629 A.2d at 885). This site-specific approach to 
choice of law is straightforward when the policyholder's 
operations are confined to one state. Id. 
 
When an insured's business is "predictably multistate," 
however, less significance attaches to the principal location 
of the insured risk. Id. In that scenario, New Jersey law 
requires a "careful site-specific determination, made upon a 
complete record," of the state with the dominant, significant 
relationship to the parties and transaction under section 6 
of the Restatement. Id. at 639 (internal quotation and 
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citation omitted). The factors relevant to that inquiry are: 
(1) the competing interests of the relevant states; (2) the 
national interests of commerce among the several states; (3) 
the interests of the parties; and (4) the interests of judicial 
administration. Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 639-40. 
 
Assessing these interests, the Pfizer Court declined to 
apply New Jersey insurance law because that state's wholly 
domestic concerns were not at stake in a dispute involving 
foreign waste sites and out-of-state parties. On the latter 
point, the Court found that the policyholder's substantial 
operations in New Jersey did not implicate New Jersey's 
interests to the extent that the company's principal place of 
business in New York affected that state's interests. Id. at 
641, 644. Because New Jersey was a disinterested state, 
application of another state's law would not impinge on the 
commercial interests of New Jersey. Id. at 641-42. 
 
The parties' fair expectations did not favor application of 
New Jersey law either, but weighed in favor of the law of 
the waste sites or that of the state of contract execution. Id. 
at 642. Nor did the interests of judicial management require 
consistent application of New Jersey law. Id.  at 642-43. 
 
On the other hand, New York had an interest in applying 
its insurance law because Pfizer was a New York 
policyholder, the contract was negotiated and executed in 
New York, and the purpose of New York's interpretation of 
the pollution exclusion clause would have been served by 
the application of New York law. Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 641. 
For that reason, applying another state's law that clashed 
with that of New York might have hindered interstate 
commerce. Id. at 641-42. In addition, the parties could 
reasonably have expected the law of the state of contracting 
to apply. Id. at 642. 
 
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the state 
where the contamination occurred had an interest in 
applying its law, and that applying contrary law from 
another jurisdiction could frustrate interstate commerce. 
Moreover, in the absence of a choice of law provision in the 
contract, a policyholder "would expect that it would be 
indemnified under the law in effect at the place where 
liability is imposed." Id. at 642. 
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In short, the court determined that New York and the 
state where the waste sites were located both had a 
significant relationship to the coverage issues, but that New 
Jersey did not.1 The Court ultimately resolved which state 
had the most significant relationship with the following 
rule: "In the event of a conflict between the law of New York 
and the law of the waste site, the law of the waste site 
should be applied because under the site-specific approach 
it would have the dominant significant relationship to the 
issue." Id. at 643. 
 
The Court applied these principles in Unisys, holding 
that the law of the waste sites defeated the law of New 
York, which was the state of contract execution. In that 
case, New Jersey law applied to those sites located in New 
Jersey. None of the parties had any other relevant 
connection to the forum. 712 A.2d at 651-53. 
 
HM Holdings presented a different factual situation. In 
that case, the policyholder, which had its principal place of 
business in New York during the period when 
contamination of the waste sites occurred, later moved to 
New Jersey. 712 A.2d at 646-47. Because the insured had 
become a New Jersey "domiciliary," the Court determined 
that, insofar as the late notice issue was involved, that 
state had an interest in applying its pro-policyholder law 
that would be frustrated by New York's pro-carrier 
interpretation of the clause. Id. at 648-49. New Jersey, said 
the Court, had an interest in performance of the contract 
because the insured was a domestic policyholder. 
Therefore, the law of New Jersey or the waste site controlled 
on that issue. If the law of the waste site was similar to that 
of New York, it should yield to New Jersey law unless the 
insurance company was a domestic company of the state of 
contamination. Id. at 649. Insofar as the pollution 
exclusion was concerned, however, the Court held that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Court applied similar analysis when considering the question of 
late notice, but in order to create a conflict of laws, assumed without 
deciding that New York was an interested state. Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 643- 
44. But see HM Holdings, 712 A.2d at 649 (New York has no interest in 
applying its late notice rule unless the carriers are New York based or 
the waste sites are in New York). 
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after-acquired domicile did not affect its analysis and the 
law of the waste site was still applicable. Id.  at 647-48. 
 
The Pfizer trilogy makes it unnecessary for us to re-plow 
the ground so thoroughly explored in Gilbert Spruance, 
NL (I), and General Ceramics. Consequently, we proceed 
directly to the coverage issues at hand. 
 
II. 
 
The Pollution Exclusion 
 
Under a typical pollution exclusion clause, coverage for 
pollution is excluded unless the discharge is "sudden and 
accidental." The conflicts problem arises because states 
construe the "sudden and accidental" language differently. 
Some jurisdictions interpret "sudden" to mean 
"unexpected," while others emphasize the temporal aspect 
of "sudden." As may be expected, where contamination at a 
particular site occurred gradually, interpretation of that 
clause can have a substantial bearing on coverage. Here, 
we face a conflict in construction among the laws of New 
Jersey, New York, and the waste sites. As instructed by 
Pfizer, we assess the four categories of relevant interests to 
determine which state has the most significant relationship 
to the issue. 
 
A. 
 
Just as in Pfizer, NL is not a New Jersey policyholder, but 
has its headquarters and principal place of business in New 
York where the policy was executed and issued. Although it 
has a presence in New Jersey, from an analytic standpoint 
its local activities are no different, perhaps less substantial, 
than those of the policyholder in Pfizer. 
 
As we remarked in NL (I), "New Jersey's only connection 
with this litigation is that NL was incorporated and had 
some operations there." 65 F.3d at 327. New Jersey has a 
long history of attenuating the incorporation contact when 
conducting choice of law analysis. Gantes v. Kason Corp., 
679 A.2d 106, 110-11 (N.J. 1996); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
305 A.2d 412, 414 n.3, 418 (N.J. 1973); Deemer v. Silk City 
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Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 651-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1984); cf. Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 104 
A.2d 670, 676 (N.J. 1954) (forum non conveniens  case). 
Although such minimal contacts may have a bearing in 
other contexts, they "must be viewed in perspective." Pfizer, 
712 A.2d at 644; see also Veazey v. Doremus, 510 A.2d 
1187, 1189-90 (N.J. 1986) (parties' contacts relevant only if 
they relate to policy of the law). 
 
To the extent that New Jersey is the location of some of 
the contaminated sites, its interest in applying its domestic 
law does not differ from that of other polluted locations. 
The circumstances here are so similar to those in Pfizer 
that its analysis governs. New York and the state of the 
waste site have strong interests in having their law apply. 
 
B. 
 
The interests of commerce parallel those in Pfizer. 
Commerce would be hindered if New Jersey law were 
applied to determine a dispute with which that state"does 
not have a dominant and significant relationship." Pfizer, 
712 A.2d at 642. Again, New York and the state of the 
waste site have an interest in having their law apply. 
 
C. 
 
The interests of the parties focus on their justified 
expectations and the need for predictability of result. As in 
Pfizer, the insurance contracts are silent on the applicable 
choice of law. Consequently, "in the absence of a choice-of- 
law provision, a policyholder would expect that it would be 
indemnified under the law in effect at the place where 
liability is imposed. The policies contain sweeping 
declarations of coverage that should be given effect where 
the risks [arose]." Id. at 642. This consideration militates in 
favor of having the law of the waste site apply. 
 
D. 
 
The final category examines judicial administration. We 
do not wish to underestimate the burden the trial court will 
face when cataloging and ruling on the applicable law at 
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each of the many sites involved in this litigation. We 
recognize, however, that the court and the parties are free 
to work out practical ways to reduce and consolidate the 
issues. Indeed, as counsel for one of the parties explained 
in the district court: "We agreed to a case management 
structure in which two sites would go to trial first . . . so 
we could look at the outcome in those cases and hopefully 
get guidance from which we could all reach a global 
solution to this hundred-forty-some claim case." J.A. 1766- 
67. 
 
We doubt that the laws of each of the waste sites contain 
multiple, esoteric distinctions. Rather, we expect that there 
will be a few interpretations applicable to various groups of 
sites. We agree with Pfizer that, although case management 
problems for the trial court are substantial, they can be 
resolved through the ingenuity and skill of court and 
counsel. 
 
In conclusion, we follow Pfizer's lead and hold that 
(except with respect to New Jersey waste sites) New Jersey 
law does not govern interpretation of the pollution 
exclusion clause. The choice of law is between New York 
(the place of contracting and location of the insured's 
headquarters) and the state of contamination. "In the event 
of a conflict between the law of New York and the law of the 
waste site, the law of the waste site should be applied 
because under the site-specific approach it would have the 
dominant significant relationship to the issue." Pfizer, 712 
A.2d at 643. 
 
III. 
 
Late Notice 
 
Most liability policies require the insured to give prompt 
notice of an event that falls within the scope of coverage. 
Some states, including New Jersey, require a carrier to 
prove that it has been prejudiced by the untimely notice 
before it may deny coverage. Other jurisdictions, including 
New York, do not require a demonstration of prejudice in 
order to assert the defense of late notice. 
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As Pfizer acknowledged, states where waste sites are 
located may have adopted one of these two approaches. 
New Jersey added the element of prejudice for "the 
protection of New Jersey policyholders." Id.  at 644. As 
mentioned above, however, the fact that Pfizer  did business 
in New Jersey and was incorporated there did not make it 
a New Jersey policyholder entitled to the protection of New 
Jersey law at the expense of the laws of the competing 
states. That analysis applies with equal force here. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the law of the waste site 
should govern if it differs from the law of New York. 
 
HM Holdings is not to the contrary. In that case, the 
insured was a "domiciliary" of New Jersey at the time notice 
was given. For that reason, the Court held that New Jersey 
law should apply. In this case, NL remained headquartered 
in New York and no significant change reduced its strong 
New York presence. 
 
IV. 
 
To summarize, we answer the certified questions as 
follows: 
 
       (1) Under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
       New York law provides the rule for deciding 
       whether the pollution exclusion clauses in the 
       respective policies bar coverage for environmental 
       contamination. If a conflict exists between New 
       York law and the law of the waste site, then the 
       law of the waste site shall apply. 
 
       (2) Under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
       New York law provides the rule for deciding 
       whether the notice of claims were timely under the 
       insurance contracts. If a conflict exists between 
       New York law and the law of the waste site, then 
       the law of the waste site shall apply.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. International and International Surplus stand in a different position 
than the other carriers because they are headquartered in Illinois and do 
not insure the Oregon site. In addition, they are solely interested in the 
question of late notice because their policies do not contain pollution 
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Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
exclusion language similar to that of the other carriers. Finally, their 
policies provide coverage on a "claims made," rather than an 
"occurrence," basis, which may be relevant when considering the effect 
of late notice. Accordingly, Illinois law should apply when construing the 
late-notice provisions applicable to these carriers. See HM Holdings, 712 
A.2d at 649. 
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